Political districting without geography
Gerdus Benade, Nam Ho-Nguyen, J. N. Hooker

TL;DR
This paper explores political districting without geographical constraints, providing mathematical insights into proportionality, competitiveness, and critiquing the efficiency gap as a gerrymandering measure.
Contribution
It offers a theoretical analysis of districting without geography, highlighting the contrast between proportionality and competitiveness and exposing limitations of the efficiency gap.
Findings
Distinguishes between proportionality and competitiveness in districting
Identifies weaknesses in the efficiency gap as a gerrymandering metric
Provides insights to inform model construction without geographical constraints
Abstract
Geographical considerations such as contiguity and compactness are necessary elements of political districting in practice. Yet an analysis of the problem without such constraints yields mathematical insights that can inform real-world model construction. In particular, it clarifies the sharp contrast between proportionality and competitiveness and how it might be overcome in a properly formulated objective function. It also reveals serious weaknesses of the much-discussed efficiency gap as a criterion for gerrymandering.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Electoral Systems and Political Participation
