Level-strategyproof Belief Aggregation Mechanisms
Rida Laraki, Estelle Varloot

TL;DR
This paper introduces the concept of level-strategyproofness (level-SP) for aggregating expert probabilistic predictions, providing axiomatic characterizations, impossibility bounds, and practical methods that extend voting rules to uncertain grading scenarios.
Contribution
It defines level-SP, characterizes its aggregation functions, and develops new practical methods with applications to voting and expert prediction aggregation.
Findings
Level-SP implies incentive compatibility over single-peaked preferences.
Axiomatic characterization of level-SP aggregation functions.
Introduction of proportional-cumulative and middlemost-cumulative methods.
Abstract
In the problem of aggregating experts' probabilistic predictions over an ordered set of outcomes, we introduce the axiom of level-strategy\-proofness (level-SP) and prove that it is a natural notion with several applications. Moreover, it is a robust concept as it implies incentive compatibility in a rich domain of single-peakedness over the space of cumulative distribution functions (CDFs). This contrasts with the literature which assumes single-peaked preferences over the space of probability distributions. Our main results are: (1) a reduction of our problem to the aggregation of CDFs; (2) the axiomatic characterization of level-SP probability aggregation functions with and without the addition of other axioms; (3) impossibility results which provide bounds for our characterization; (4) the axiomatic characterization of two new and practical level-SP methods: the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Constraint Satisfaction and Optimization · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
