Optimal Revenue Guarantees for Pricing in Large Markets
Jos\'e Correa (UCHILE), Dana Pizarro (TSE), Victor Verdugo (UOH)

TL;DR
This paper investigates revenue guarantees of posted price mechanisms in large markets, showing improved bounds for fixed-price policies and analyzing the impact of market size and multiple units on revenue performance.
Contribution
It proves that fixed-price posted price mechanisms achieve higher revenue guarantees in large markets and analyzes how these guarantees change with multiple units.
Findings
Fixed-price PPM guarantee improves from 0.632 to 0.712 in large markets.
Large market advantage diminishes as the number of units increases.
Revenue gap approaches 1 - 1/√(2kπ) for selling k units.
Abstract
Posted price mechanisms (PPM) constitute one of the predominant practices to price goods in online marketplaces and their revenue guarantees have been a central object of study in the last decade. We consider a basic setting where the buyers' valuations are independent and identically distributed and there is a single unit on sale. It is well-known that this setting is equivalent to the so-called i.i.d. prophet inequality, for which optimal guarantees are known and evaluate to 0.745 in general (equivalent to a PPM with dynamic prices) and in the fixed threshold case (equivalent to a fixed price PPM). In this paper we consider an additional assumption, namely, that the underlying market is very large. This is modeled by first fixing a valuation distribution F and then making the number of buyers grow large, rather than considering the worst distribution for each…
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