Apportionment with Parity Constraints
Claire Mathieu, Victor Verdugo

TL;DR
This paper explores methods for apportioning parliamentary seats under parity constraints, analyzing a greedy mechanism and a biproportional approach, with theoretical insights and bounds on their differences.
Contribution
It introduces and analyzes a biproportional apportionment method with parity constraints, extending the understanding of two-level proportionality mechanisms.
Findings
The greedy mechanism is analyzed theoretically.
Lower bounds are established between biproportional and fractional solutions.
Insights into two-dimensional apportionment methods are provided.
Abstract
In the classic apportionment problem the goal is to decide how many seats of a parliament should be allocated to each party as a result of an election. The divisor methods provide a way of solving this problem by defining a notion of proportionality guided by some rounding rule. Motivated by recent challenges in the context of electoral apportionment, we consider the question of how to allocate the seats of a parliament under parity constraints between candidate types (e.g. equal number of men and women elected) while at the same time satisfying party proportionality. We consider two different approaches for this problem. The first mechanism, that follows a greedy approach, corresponds to a recent mechanism used in the Chilean Constitutional Convention 2021 election. We analyze this mechanism from a theoretical point of view. The second mechanism follows the idea of biproportionality…
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Taxonomy
TopicsConsumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Analytic Number Theory Research · Mathematics and Applications
