Probabilistic annotations for protocol models

TL;DR

This paper introduces a probabilistic Hoare logic framework for reasoning about security properties in cryptosystems and puzzles, demonstrating its effectiveness through analysis of cryptographic protocols and trust-based puzzles.

Contribution

It presents a novel probabilistic logic approach for security reasoning, applied to cryptosystems and trust-based puzzles, with proofs of security and disproofs of vulnerabilities.

Findings

Verified security of Vernam and El-Gamal cryptosystems

Disproved certain security properties of these cryptosystems

Analyzed trust and noise in a modified Muddy Children puzzle

Abstract

We describe how a probabilistic Hoare logic with localities can be used for reasoning about security. As a proof-of-concept, we analyze Vernam and El-Gamal cryptosystems, prove the security properties that they do satisfy and disprove those that they do not. We also consider a version of the Muddy Children puzzle, where children's trust and noise are taken into account.