Large population games with interactions through controls and common noise: convergence results and equivalence between $open$--$loop$ and $closed$--$loop$ controls
Mao Fabrice Djete

TL;DR
This paper investigates convergence and equivalence of open-loop and closed-loop controls in large population games with common noise, establishing that their limits coincide in mean field game and control frameworks.
Contribution
It proves the equivalence between open-loop and closed-loop formulations in mean field control and game settings with common noise, and characterizes their convergence properties.
Findings
Closed-loop Nash equilibria converge to measure-valued MFG equilibria.
Open-loop and closed-loop limits are shown to be equivalent.
Convergence results for approximate Pareto equilibria are provided.
Abstract
In the presence of a common noise, we study the convergence problems in mean field game (MFG) and mean field control (MFC) problem where the cost function and the state dynamics depend upon the joint conditional distribution of the controlled state and the control process. In the first part, we consider the MFG setting. We start by recalling the notions of -- MFG equilibria and of approximate -- Nash equilibria associated to the corresponding --player game. Then, we show that all convergent sequences of approximate -- Nash equilibria, when converge to -- MFG equilibria. And conversely, any -- MFG equilibrium is the limit of a sequence of approximate -- Nash equilibria. In other words, -- MFG equilibria are the accumulation points of the approximate…
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