Single-Leader-Multiple-Followers Stackelberg Security Game with Hypergame Framework

TL;DR

This paper uses a hypergame framework to analyze a complex security game with one leader and multiple followers, focusing on misinformation scenarios like misperception and deception, and examines the stability and robustness of equilibria.

Contribution

It introduces a hypergame-based approach to analyze the stability of equilibria in SLMF Stackelberg security games under misinformation conditions.

Findings

Identifies conditions for stability of equilibria with misinformation.

Provides a criterion for strategic and cognitive stability using hyper Nash equilibrium.

Analyzes the robustness of equilibria against misinformation influence.

Abstract

In this paper, we employ a hypergame framework to analyze the single-leader-multiple-followers (SLMF) Stackelberg security game with two typical misinformed situations: misperception and deception. We provide a stability criterion with the help of hyper Nash equilibrium (HNE) to investigate both strategic stability and cognitive stability of equilibria in SLMF games with misinformation. In fact, we find mild stable conditions such that the equilibria with misperception and deception can become HNE. Moreover, we discuss the robustness of the equilibria to reveal whether players have the ability to keep their profits under the influence of some misinformation.