Instances of small size with no weakly stable matching for three-sided problem with complete cyclic preferences
E.Yu Lerner

TL;DR
This paper constructs a counterexample of size 20 for the three-sided stable matching problem with cyclic preferences, disproving a prior conjecture that solutions always exist for such problems.
Contribution
It reduces the known size of a counterexample for the 3D cyclic stable matching problem from 90 to 20, providing new insights into the problem's complexity.
Findings
Counterexample of size 20 disproves the conjecture
The problem of always finding a stable matching does not hold for all instances
Discussion of a variant where solutions always exist
Abstract
Given men, women, and dogs, we assume that each man has a complete preference list of women, while each woman does a complete preference list of dogs, and each dog does a complete preference list of men. We study the so-called 3D-CYC problem, i.e., a three-dimensional problem with cyclic preferences. We understand a matching as a collection of nonintersecting triples, each of which contains a man, a woman, and a dog. A matching is said to be nonstable, if one can find a man, a woman, and a dog, which belong to different triples and prefer each other to their current partners in the corresponding triples. Otherwise, the matching is said to be stable. According to the conjecture proposed by Eriksson, S\"ostrand, and Strimling (2006), the problem of finding a stable matching (the problem 3DSM-CYC) always has a solution. However, Lam and Paxton have proposed an algorithm for…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs · Auction Theory and Applications
