A mathematical definition of property rights in a Debreu economy
Abhimanyu Pallavi Sudhir
TL;DR
This paper provides a formal mathematical framework for property rights within Debreu's abstract economy, defining rights structures, government, and non-attenuation to underpin property rights theory.
Contribution
It introduces rigorous mathematical definitions for property rights concepts in a generalized N-person game setting, advancing formal economic theory.
Findings
Formal definitions for rights structures and government in Debreu economy
Establishment of non-attenuation as a key property
Foundation for further theoretical analysis of property rights
Abstract
We present mathematical definitions for rights structures, government and non-attenuation in a generalized N-person game (Debreu abstract economy), thus providing a formal basis for property rights theory.
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Economic Theory and Institutions · Game Theory and Applications