Employing Altruistic Vehicles at On-ramps to Improve the Social Traffic Conditions

TL;DR

This paper explores how deploying altruistic vehicles at highway on-ramps can enhance overall traffic flow by encouraging cooperative merging behaviors, analyzing ideal and uncertain measurement scenarios.

Contribution

It introduces a model where altruistic vehicles optimize for social benefit, providing conditions for improved traffic efficiency and strategies under measurement uncertainty.

Findings

Altruistic vehicles can reduce social delay when properly proportioned.

Optimal weight configurations depend on measurement accuracy of altruistic costs.

The approach improves on traditional selfish vehicle models by incorporating altruism.

Abstract

Highway on-ramps are regarded as typical bottlenecks in transportation networks. In previous work, mainline vehicles' selfish lane choice behavior at on-ramps is studied and regarded as one cause leading to on-ramp inefficiency. When on-ramp vehicles plan to merge into the mainline of the highway, mainline vehicles choose to either stay steadfast on the current lane or bypass the merging area by switching to a neighboring lane farther from the on-ramp. Selfish vehicles make the decisions to minimize their own travel delay, which compromises the efficiency of the whole on-ramp. Results in previous work have shown that, if we can encourage a proper portion of mainline vehicles to bypass rather than to stay steadfast, the social traffic conditions can be improved. In this work, we consider employing a proportion of altruistic vehicles among the selfish mainline vehicles to improve the efficiency of the on-ramps. The altruistic vehicles are individual optimizers, making decisions whether to stay steadfast or bypass to minimize their own altruistic cost, which is a weighted sum of the travel delay and their negative impact on other vehicles. We first consider the ideal case that altruistic costs can be perfectly measured by altruistic vehicles. We give the conditions for the proportion of altruistic vehicles and the weight configuration of the altruistic costs, under which the social delay can be decreased or reach the optimal. Subsequently, we consider the impact of uncertainty in the measurement of altruistic costs and we give the optimal weight configuration for altruistic vehicles which minimizes the worst-case social delay under such uncertainty.