Monotone Comparative Statics in the Calvert-Wittman Model

TL;DR

This paper explores how commitment ability affects policy outcomes in electoral contests, showing a positive relationship between candidate preferences and enacted policies when parties can commit, and a potential negative relationship otherwise.

Contribution

It establishes the conditions under which monotone comparative statics hold in the Calvert-Wittman model, highlighting the role of commitment in electoral policy outcomes.

Findings

Positive association between preferred and enacted policies with commitment

Negative association can occur when parties cannot commit

Implications for interpreting policy deviations in elections

Abstract

In this paper, we show that when policy-motivated parties can commit to a particular platform during a uni-dimensional electoral contest where valence issues do not arise there must be a positive association between the policies preferred by candidates and the policies adopted in expectation in the lowest and the highest equilibria of the electoral contest. We also show that this need not be so if the parties cannot commit to a particular policy. The implication is that evidence of a negative relationship between enacted and preferred policies is suggestive of parties that hold positions from which they would like to move from yet are unable to do so.