Semi-Random Impossibilities of Condorcet Criterion

TL;DR

This paper proves semi-random impossibility results showing that many voting rules are unlikely to satisfy the Condorcet criterion alongside other desirable properties as the number of voters grows large.

Contribution

It introduces the first semi-random impossibility theorems for the Condorcet criterion combined with participation, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness in large elections.

Findings

Likelihood of satisfying CC and other properties approaches zero as voters increase.

Results match known lower bounds, indicating asymptotic optimality of common voting rules.

Applicable under broad semi-random models including Impartial Culture.

Abstract

The Condorcet criterion (CC) is a classical and well-accepted criterion for voting. Unfortunately, it is incompatible with many other desiderata including participation (Par), half-way monotonicity (HM), Maskin monotonicity (MM), and strategy-proofness (SP). Such incompatibilities are often known as impossibility theorems, and are proved by worst-case analysis. Previous work has investigated the likelihood for these impossibilities to occur under certain models, which are often criticized of being unrealistic. We strengthen previous work by proving the first set of semi-random impossibilities for voting rules to satisfy CC and the more general, group versions of the four desiderata: for any sufficiently large number of voters $n$, any size of the group $1\le B\le \sqrt n$, any voting rule $r$, and under a large class of {\em semi-random} models that include Impartial Culture, the likelihood for $r$ to satisfy CC and Par, CC and HM, CC and MM, or CC and SP is $1-\Omega(\frac{B}{\sqrt n})$. This matches existing lower bounds for CC and Par ($B=1$) and CC and SP ($B\le \sqrt n$), showing that many commonly-studied voting rules are already asymptotically optimal in such cases.