Strategic Instrumental Variable Regression: Recovering Causal Relationships From Strategic Responses
Keegan Harris, Daniel Ngo, Logan Stapleton, Hoda Heidari, Zhiwei, Steven Wu

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel method leveraging strategic responses to machine learning models as instrumental variables to recover causal relationships despite unobserved confounding, improving fairness and decision quality.
Contribution
It establishes a new connection between strategic responses and IV regression, enabling causal inference in strategic settings with unobserved confounders.
Findings
The sequence of deployed models acts as an instrument affecting observable features.
The method improves individual fairness and agent outcomes.
Deviating from causal coefficients can cause unbounded unfairness.
Abstract
In settings where Machine Learning (ML) algorithms automate or inform consequential decisions about people, individual decision subjects are often incentivized to strategically modify their observable attributes to receive more favorable predictions. As a result, the distribution the assessment rule is trained on may differ from the one it operates on in deployment. While such distribution shifts, in general, can hinder accurate predictions, our work identifies a unique opportunity associated with shifts due to strategic responses: We show that we can use strategic responses effectively to recover causal relationships between the observable features and outcomes we wish to predict, even under the presence of unobserved confounding variables. Specifically, our work establishes a novel connection between strategic responses to ML models and instrumental variable (IV) regression by…
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Taxonomy
TopicsExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Innovation Diffusion and Forecasting
