Defense against DoS and load altering attacks via model-free control: A proposal for a new cybersecurity setting

TL;DR

This paper proposes using model-free control to defend multi-area power networks against DoS and load altering cyberattacks, demonstrating its effectiveness through simulations compared to classical control methods.

Contribution

It introduces a novel application of model-free control for cybersecurity in power systems, avoiding complex modeling and showing superior resilience in simulations.

Findings

Model-free control outperforms classical control under cyberattacks.

Simulations demonstrate improved stability with MFC during attacks.

Cyberattack impact is significantly reduced using MFC.

Abstract

Defense against cyberattacks is an emerging topic related to fault-tolerant control. In order to avoid difficult mathematical modeling, model-free control (MFC) is suggested as an alternative to classical control. For illustration purpose a Load Frequency Control of multi-areas power network is considered. In the simulations, load altering attacks and Denial of Service (DoS) in the communication network are applied to the system. Our aim is to compare the impact of cyberattacks on control loops closed via respectively a classical controller in such situations and a model-free one. Computer experiments show impressive results with MFC.