Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg

TL;DR
This paper analyzes the incentives and security of Proof-of-Stake blockchains with perfect randomness, showing that strategic miners can outperform honest miners at certain stake levels, but security can be approximately achieved with enough stake.
Contribution
It introduces a formal model of Proof-of-Stake mining with perfect randomness, characterizes optimal strategies, and compares incentive security to Proof-of-Work protocols.
Findings
A miner with 32.5% stake can outperform honest miners, unlike in Proof-of-Work.
A miner with 30.8% stake cannot outperform honest miners, indicating near-PoW security.
The strategy space in PoS mining is richer and admits an optimal positive recurrent strategy.
Abstract
Proof-of-Stake blockchains based on a longest-chain consensus protocol are an attractive energy-friendly alternative to the Proof-of-Work paradigm. However, formal barriers to "getting the incentives right" were recently discovered, driven by the desire to use the blockchain itself as a source of pseudorandomness \cite{brown2019formal}. We consider instead a longest-chain Proof-of-Stake protocol with perfect, trusted, external randomness (e.g. a randomness beacon). We produce two main results. First, we show that a strategic miner can strictly outperform an honest miner with just of the total stake. Note that a miner of this size {\em cannot} outperform an honest miner in the Proof-of-Work model. This establishes that even with access to a perfect randomness beacon, incentives in Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-Stake longest-chain protocols are fundamentally different. Second,…
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