Metric-Distortion Bounds under Limited Information
Ioannis Anagnostides, Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos

TL;DR
This paper investigates metric distortion in voting mechanisms with limited ordinal information, providing bounds for pairwise comparison-based and incomplete ranking mechanisms, and analyzing sample complexity for near-optimal distortion.
Contribution
It introduces new bounds for distortion under limited comparisons and rankings, and establishes distribution-independent sample complexity results for high-probability guarantees.
Findings
Deterministic knockout mechanism achieves $ ext{O}( ext{log} m)$ distortion with $m-1$ comparisons.
Any mechanism with fewer than $m-1$ comparisons has unbounded distortion.
Sample size of $ ext{O}(m/ ext{epsilon}^2)$ voters suffices for distortion $3 + ext{epsilon}$ with high probability.
Abstract
In this work we study the metric distortion problem in voting theory under a limited amount of ordinal information. Our primary contribution is threefold. First, we consider mechanisms which perform a sequence of pairwise comparisons between candidates. We show that a widely-popular deterministic mechanism employed in most knockout phases yields distortion while eliciting only out of possible pairwise comparisons, where represents the number of candidates. Our analysis for this mechanism leverages a powerful technical lemma recently developed by Kempe \cite{DBLP:conf/aaai/000120a}. We also provide a matching lower bound on its distortion. In contrast, we prove that any mechanism which performs fewer than pairwise comparisons is destined to have unbounded distortion. Moreover, we study the power of deterministic mechanisms under…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications
