Neyman-Pearson Hypothesis Testing, Epistemic Reliability and Pragmatic Value-Laden Asymmetric Error Risks

TL;DR

This paper critically examines Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing, highlighting its limitations in ensuring epistemic reliability when pragmatic, value-laden error asymmetries are present, and discusses the lack of methodological remedies.

Contribution

It reveals the epistemic vulnerabilities of Neyman-Pearson testing under pragmatic error asymmetries and emphasizes the need for methodological adjustments.

Findings

Neyman-Pearson theory does not guarantee minimal epistemic error.

Pragmatic value-laden error asymmetries can compromise epistemic reliability.

No existing method can fully neutralize the negative effects of error asymmetries.

Abstract

Neyman and Pearson's theory of testing hypotheses does not warrant minimal epistemic reliability: the feature of driving to true conclusions more often than to false ones. The theory does not protect from the possible negative effects of the pragmatic value-laden unequal setting of error probabilities on the theory's epistemic reliability. Most importantly, in the case of a negative impact, no methodological adjustment is available to neutralize it, so in such cases, the discussed pragmatic-value-ladenness of the theory inevitably compromises the goal of attaining truth.