Real-time Detection and Adaptive Mitigation of Power-based Side-Channel Leakage in SoC
Pantea Kiaei, Yuan Yao, Patrick Schaumont

TL;DR
This paper introduces a comprehensive real-time system for detecting and mitigating power-based side-channel leaks in SoC, enhancing security for cryptographic operations through adaptive hardware and software solutions.
Contribution
It presents a novel, generic real-time detection and mitigation system for power side-channel leakage in SoC, capable of protecting any cryptographic algorithm.
Findings
Effective real-time detection of side-channel leakage
Adaptive mitigation reduces leakage impact
System is applicable to various cryptographic algorithms
Abstract
Power-based side-channel is a serious security threat to the System on Chip (SoC). The secret information is leaked from the power profile of the system while a cryptographic algorithm is running. The mitigation requires efforts from both the software level and hardware level. Currently, there is no comprehensive solution that can guarantee the whole complex system is free of leakage and can generically protect all cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we propose a real-time leakage detection and mitigation system which enables the system to monitor the side-channel leakage effects of the hardware. Our proposed system has extensions that provide a real-time monitor of power consumption, detection of side-channel leakage, and real-time adaptive mitigation of detected side-channel leakage. Our proposed system is generic and can protect any algorithm running on it.
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Taxonomy
TopicsCryptographic Implementations and Security · Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security · Security and Verification in Computing
