On the Differential Cryptanalysis of SEPAR Cipher

TL;DR

This paper analyzes the SEPAR lightweight cipher's resistance to differential cryptanalysis, providing proofs that it maintains security against such attacks through active S-boxes and tight bounds.

Contribution

It extends previous research by proving the cipher's robustness against differential cryptanalysis with a detailed analysis of active S-boxes and resistance bounds.

Findings

SEPAR has sufficient active S-boxes to resist differential cryptanalysis

The study provides a tight bound on the cipher's resistance

The cipher's design ensures security against differential attacks

Abstract

SEPAR is a lightweight cryptographic algorithm, designed to implement on resource-constrained devices especially those employed in IoT environments. Meanwhile, the mixed structure design of cipher leads to speed improvement while guaranteeing its resistance against common cryptographic attacks, especially differential and linear attacks. In order to confirm the resistance of the cipher against differential attack, an extensive investigation was presented in our previous work. In his study, we conduct new research continuing the previously presented research. We prove that there are enough active S-boxes so as to resist cipher against differential cryptanalysis. Moreover, this can provide a tight bound of resisting cipher against this attack.