Epistemic Modality and Coordination under Uncertainty

TL;DR

This paper explores how epistemic modality, like 'might p', can signal uncertainty to improve coordination under conditions of high vagueness and lack of shared knowledge, using game theory and Bayesian reasoning.

Contribution

It offers a novel game-theoretic explanation for the communicative function of epistemic modality in uncertain coordination scenarios.

Findings

Asserting 'Might p' reveals speaker's uncertainty.

Epistemic modality can enhance coordination despite shared knowledge gaps.

The approach combines relational semantics, assertion theory, and Bayesian reasoning.

Abstract

Communication facilitates coordination, but coordination might fail if there's too much uncertainty. I discuss a scenario in which vagueness-driven uncertainty undermines the possibility of publicly sharing a belief. I then show that asserting an epistemic modal sentence, 'Might p', can reveal the speaker's uncertainty, and that this may improve the chances of coordination despite the lack of a common epistemic ground. This provides a game-theoretic rationale for epistemic modality. The account draws on a standard relational semantics for epistemic modality, Stalnaker's theory of assertion as informative update, and a Bayesian framework for reasoning under uncertainty.