Measuring Violations of Positive Involvement in Voting
Wesley H. Holliday (University of California, Berkeley), Eric Pacuit, (University of Maryland)

TL;DR
This paper examines how often and under what conditions voting methods violate positive involvement, revealing that some standard methods undermine voter influence despite seeming fair.
Contribution
It introduces new measures for quantifying violations of positive involvement and analyzes these violations through computer simulations under various models.
Findings
Certain voting methods frequently violate positive involvement.
Violations are more significant when considering voter potency and conditional probabilities.
Some methods diminish voter influence even when violations are rare.
Abstract
In the context of computational social choice, we study voting methods that assign a set of winners to each profile of voter preferences. A voting method satisfies the property of positive involvement (PI) if for any election in which a candidate x would be among the winners, adding another voter to the election who ranks x first does not cause x to lose. Surprisingly, a number of standard voting methods violate this natural property. In this paper, we investigate different ways of measuring the extent to which a voting method violates PI, using computer simulations. We consider the probability (under different probability models for preferences) of PI violations in randomly drawn profiles vs. profile-coalition pairs (involving coalitions of different sizes). We argue that in order to choose between a voting method that satisfies PI and one that does not, we should consider the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
