Well-Founded Extensive Games with Perfect Information

TL;DR

This paper investigates extensive games with perfect information and well-founded game trees, focusing on the existence and characterization of subgame perfect equilibria, especially in specific two-player zero-sum cases.

Contribution

It provides new characterizations of subgame perfect equilibria in well-founded extensive games, including special cases for two-player zero-sum games with two or three outcomes.

Findings

Characterization of subgame perfect equilibria in well-founded games

Existence results for specific two-player zero-sum cases

Analytical framework for equilibrium analysis in extensive games

Abstract

We consider extensive games with perfect information with well-founded game trees and study the problems of existence and of characterization of the sets of subgame perfect equilibria in these games. We also provide such characterizations for two classes of these games in which subgame perfect equilibria exist: two-player zero-sum games with, respectively, two and three outcomes.