On Simple Mechanisms for Dependent Items
Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou

TL;DR
This paper investigates simple selling mechanisms for a single buyer with dependent valuations modeled by Markov Random Fields, providing approximation guarantees that depend on the dependency structure and extending known results to complex valuation classes.
Contribution
It extends revenue approximation results to dependent item valuations modeled by MRFs, introducing new bounds and techniques for XOS and other valuation classes.
Findings
Max(SRev,BRev) achieves an exponential approximation depending on MRF parameter Δ.
Results recover constant-factor approximations in the independent case.
New concentration inequality for XOS functions over dependent variables.
Abstract
We study the problem of selling heterogeneous items to a single buyer, whose values for different items are dependent. Under arbitrary dependence, Hart and Nisan show that no simple mechanism can achieve a non-negligible fraction of the optimal revenue even with only two items. We consider the setting where the buyer's type is drawn from a correlated distribution that can be captured by a Markov Random Field, one of the most prominent frameworks for modeling high-dimensional distributions with structure. If the buyer's valuation is additive or unit-demand, we extend the result to all MRFs and show that max(SRev,BRev) can achieve an -fraction of the optimal revenue, where is a parameter of the MRF that is determined by how much the value of an item can be influenced by the values of the other items. We further show that the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Markov Chains and Monte Carlo Methods · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
