Virus-immune dynamics determined by prey-predator interaction network and epistasis in viral fitness landscape
Cameron J. Browne, Fadoua Yahia

TL;DR
This paper models virus-immune interactions as a prey-predator network, revealing how epistasis in viral fitness landscapes influences long-term dynamics, stability, and evolution of viral mutants under immune pressure.
Contribution
It extends existing models by linking ecology, evolution, and genetics, demonstrating the role of epistasis in viral resistance and network stability.
Findings
Epistasis shapes viral evolution and resistance.
Network stability depends on fitness landscape circuits.
Immune response infusions can induce bifurcations in viral strains.
Abstract
Population dynamics and evolutionary genetics underly the structure of ecosystems, changing on the same timescale for interacting species with rapid turnover, such as virus (e.g. HIV) and immune response. Thus, an important problem in mathematical modeling is to connect ecology, evolution and genetics, which often have been treated separately. Here, extending analysis of multiple virus and immune response populations in a resource - prey (consumer) - predator model from Browne and Smith \cite{browne2018dynamics}, we show that long term dynamics of viral mutants evolving resistance at distinct epitopes (viral proteins targeted by immune responses) are governed by epistasis in the virus fitness landscape. In particular, the stability of persistent equilibrium virus-immune (prey-predator) network structures, such as nested and one-to-one, and bifurcations are determined by a collection of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsMathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
