Valued Authorization Policy Existence Problem: Theory and Experiments
Jason Crampton, Eduard Eiben, Gregory Gutin, Daniel Karapetyan,, Diptapriyo Majumdar

TL;DR
This paper introduces the Valued Authorization Policy Existence Problem (APEP), which finds the least violating authorization policy, analyzes its computational complexity, and demonstrates practical solution approaches through experiments.
Contribution
It formulates the Valued APEP, analyzes its fixed-parameter tractability, and develops efficient MIP-based algorithms with experimental validation.
Findings
Valued APEP is FPT under certain constraints.
The proposed MIP formulation outperforms naive methods.
Benchmark instances demonstrate practical effectiveness.
Abstract
Recent work has shown that many problems of satisfiability and resiliency in workflows may be viewed as special cases of the authorization policy existence problem (APEP), which returns an authorization policy if one exists and 'No' otherwise. However, in many practical settings it would be more useful to obtain a 'least bad' policy than just a 'No', where 'least bad' is characterized by some numerical value indicating the extent to which the policy violates the base authorization relation and constraints. Accordingly, we introduce the Valued APEP, which returns an authorization policy of minimum weight, where the (non-negative) weight is determined by the constraints violated by the returned solution. We then establish a number of results concerning the parameterized complexity of Valued APEP. We prove that the problem is fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) if the set of constraints…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAccess Control and Trust · Cloud Computing and Resource Management · Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
