Individually Rational Land and Neighbor Allocation: Impossibility Results

TL;DR

This paper proves that in land allocation with neighbor considerations, it is impossible to design a mechanism that is strategyproof, Pareto optimal, and individually rational simultaneously.

Contribution

It establishes fundamental impossibility results demonstrating the incompatibility of key economic properties in land and neighbor allocation problems.

Findings

Strategyproofness, Pareto optimality, and individual rationality cannot all be achieved together.

Two formal impossibility theorems are proved.

Highlights limitations in designing fair and efficient land allocation mechanisms.

Abstract

We consider a setting in which agents are allocated land plots and they have additive preferences over which plot they get and who their neighbor is. Strategyproofness, Pareto optimality, and individual rationality are three fundamental properties in economic design. We present two impossibility results showing that the three properties are incompatible in this context.