Formally Verified Next-Generation Airborne Collision Avoidance Games in ACAS X
Rachel Cleaveland, Stefan Mitsch, Andr\'e Platzer

TL;DR
This paper introduces a formally verified, game-theoretic model of aircraft collision avoidance in ACAS X, providing provable safety guarantees for complex, adversarial flight scenarios through differential game logic.
Contribution
It generalizes ACAS X to hybrid games with independent decision-makers and proves the existence of safe strategies using differential game logic.
Findings
Proved collision-freedom in complex aircraft encounter models.
Developed symbolic conditions for safe maneuvers.
Established the existence of winning strategies for ownship.
Abstract
The design of aircraft collision avoidance algorithms is a subtle but important challenge that merits the need for provable safety guarantees. Obtaining such guarantees is nontrivial given the unpredictability of the interplay of the intruder aircraft decisions, the ownship pilot reactions, and the subtlety of the continuous motion dynamics of aircraft. Existing collision avoidance systems, such as TCAS and the Next-Generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System ACAS X, have been analyzed assuming severe restrictions on the intruder's flight maneuvers, limiting their safety guarantees in real-world scenarios where the intruder may change its course. This work takes a conceptually significant and practically relevant departure from existing ACAS X models by generalizing them to hybrid games with first-class representations of the ownship and intruder decisions coming from two independent…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsTraffic control and management · Guidance and Control Systems
