Justice as a Social Bargain and Optimization Problem
Andreas Siemoneit

TL;DR
This paper models justice as a social bargain and optimization problem, emphasizing reciprocity, fairness, and institutional mechanisms to promote just and efficient societal exchanges.
Contribution
It presents a novel framework viewing justice through the lens of social bargaining and optimization, integrating evolutionary, psychological, and economic perspectives.
Findings
Reciprocity underpins justice and social cooperation.
Equality and need are effective principles alongside merit.
Taxing economic rents promotes justice in market economies.
Abstract
The question of "Justice" still divides social research and moral philosophy. Several Theories of Justice and conceptual approaches compete here, and distributive justice remains a major societal controversy. From an evolutionary point of view, fair and just exchange can be nothing but "equivalent", and this makes "strict" reciprocity (merit, equity) the foundational principle of justice, both theoretically and empirically. But besides being just, justice must be effective, efficient, and communicable. Moral reasoning is a communicative strategy for resolving conflict, enhancing status, and maintaining cooperation, thereby making justice rather a social bargain and an optimization problem. Social psychology (intuitions, rules of thumb, self-bindings) can inform us when and why the two auxiliary principles equality and need are more likely to succeed than merit would. Nevertheless, both…
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Taxonomy
TopicsExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Economic Theory and Institutions · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
