A New Transmit Antenna Selection Technique for Physical Layer Security with Strong Eavesdropping

TL;DR

This paper introduces a novel transmit antenna selection method that enhances physical layer security by outperforming traditional schemes, especially against strong eavesdroppers, without needing their instantaneous channel information.

Contribution

The paper presents a new antenna selection technique that outperforms conventional methods in securing wireless communications against powerful eavesdroppers, without requiring their channel state information.

Findings

Eavesdropper-based antenna selection outperforms conventional TAS.

The new scheme is effective even without eavesdropper's instantaneous CSI.

Analytical and simulation results confirm improved security in strong eavesdropper scenarios.

Abstract

We propose a new transmit antenna selection (TAS) technique that can be beneficial for physical layer security purposes. Specifically, we show that the conventional TAS criterion based on the legitimate channel state information (CSI) is not recommended when the average signal-to-noise ratio for the illegitimate user becomes comparable or superior to that of the legitimate user. We illustrate that an eavesdropper's based antenna selection technique outperforms conventional TAS, without explicit knowledge of the eavesdropper's instantaneous CSI. Analytical expressions and simulation results to support this comparison are given, showing how this new TAS scheme is a better choice in scenarios with a strong eavesdropper.