TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that wireless charging interfaces are vulnerable to power side-channel attacks, enabling private information leakage from smartphones during charging, with high accuracy in website fingerprinting for both iOS and Android devices.
Contribution
It introduces and demonstrates the first power side-channel attack via wireless charging, comparing it to wired charging and analyzing factors affecting leakage.
Findings
Wireless charging leaks private activity information.
Attack accuracy reaches up to 95% for Android devices.
Information leakage varies with website content and battery level.
Abstract
This paper shows that today's wireless charging interface is vulnerable to power side-channel attacks; a smartphone charging wirelessly leaks private information about its activity to the wireless charger (charging transmitter). We present a website fingerprinting attack through the wireless charging side-channel for both iOS and Android devices. The attack monitors the current drawn by the wireless charging transmitter while 20 webpages from the Alexa top sites list are loaded on a charging smartphone. We implement a classifier that correctly identifies unlabeled current traces with an accuracy of 87% on average for an iPhone 11 and 95% on average for a Google Pixel 4. This represents a considerable security threat because wireless charging does not require any user permission if the phone is within the range of a charging transmitter. To the best of our knowledge, this work represents…
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