Fair and Efficient Resource Allocation with Partial Information

TL;DR

This paper explores how limited preference information affects fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods, analyzing the minimal information needed for fairness and the welfare loss due to partial data.

Contribution

It characterizes the amount of preference ranking information required to achieve key fairness guarantees and quantifies welfare loss from partial preferences.

Findings

Identifies the minimal ranking length for envy-freeness up to one good.

Quantifies the welfare loss due to partial information.

Provides bounds on fairness and efficiency trade-offs.

Abstract

We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her $k$ most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We characterize the value of $k$ needed to achieve envy-freeness up to one good and approximate maximin share guarantee, two widely studied fairness notions. We also analyze the multiplicative loss in social welfare incurred due to the lack of full information with and without the fairness requirements.