Security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution against canonical attacks

TL;DR

This paper analyzes the security of Gaussian-modulated coherent-state quantum key distribution protocols against canonical Gaussian attacks, providing asymptotic and finite-size key rate results using a new security framework.

Contribution

It introduces a comprehensive security analysis of CV-QKD protocols under canonical attacks, including finite-size effects with a novel composable security approach.

Findings

Derived asymptotic key rates under canonical attacks

Extended analysis to finite-size regimes with composable security

Demonstrated robustness of protocols against collective Gaussian attacks

Abstract

We investigate the performance of Gaussianmodulated coherent-state QKD protocols in the presence of canonical attacks, which are collective Gaussian attacks resulting in Gaussian channels described by one of the possible canonical forms. We present asymptotic key rates and then we extend the results to the finite-size regime using a recently-developed toolbox for composable security.