Competing spreading dynamics in simplicial complex
Wenyao Li, Xiaoyu Xue, Liming Pan, Tao Lin, Wei Wang

TL;DR
This paper investigates how higher-order interactions in simplicial complexes influence competing epidemic spreading dynamics, revealing complex phase behaviors and the emergence of new dominant regions.
Contribution
It introduces a novel model of competing epidemics on simplicial complexes, analyzing the effects of 2-simplex infection strength on phase transitions and dominance patterns.
Findings
Weak 2-simplex infection strength yields a phase diagram similar to simple graphs.
Increasing 2-simplex infection strength introduces an alternative dominant region.
Theoretical predictions align well with numerical simulations.
Abstract
Interactions in biology and social systems are not restricted to pairwise but can take arbitrary sizes. Extensive studies have revealed that the arbitrary-sized interactions significantly affect the spreading dynamics on networked systems. Competing spreading dynamics, i.e., several epidemics spread simultaneously and compete with each other, have been widely observed in the real world, yet the way arbitrary-sized interactions affect competing spreading dynamics still lacks systematic study. This study presents a model of two competing simplicial susceptible-infected-susceptible epidemics on a higher-order system represented by simplicial complex and analyzes the model's critical phenomena. In the proposed model, a susceptible node can only be infected by one of the two epidemics, and the transmission of infection to neighbors can occur through pairwise (i.e., an edge) and high-order…
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Taxonomy
TopicsComplex Network Analysis Techniques · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
