Targeting Makes Sample Efficiency in Auction Design
Yihang Hu, Zhiyi Huang, Yiheng Shen, Xiangning Wang

TL;DR
This paper proposes a targeted sampling model for auction design that significantly reduces sample complexity compared to traditional i.i.d. sampling, especially when the seller can specify quantile intervals.
Contribution
It introduces a new targeted sampling framework with a parameter that interpolates between existing models, improving sample efficiency in auction learning.
Findings
Targeted sampling reduces sample complexity from (n ) to () for bounded valuations.
Even mild targeting power (=o(1)) yields better sample complexity than i.i.d. sampling.
The approach applies across the full range of targeting power, [0,1).
Abstract
This paper introduces the targeted sampling model in optimal auction design. In this model, the seller may specify a quantile interval and sample from a buyer's prior restricted to the interval. This can be interpreted as allowing the seller to, for example, examine the top percents bids from previous buyers with the same characteristics. The targeting power is quantified with a parameter which lower bounds how small the quantile intervals could be. When , it degenerates to Cole and Roughgarden's model of i.i.d. samples; when it is the idealized case of , it degenerates to the model studied by Chen et al. (2018). For instance, for buyers with bounded values in , targeted samples suffice while it is known that at least i.i.d. samples are needed. In other words,…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing · Machine Learning and Algorithms
