De-Pois: An Attack-Agnostic Defense against Data Poisoning Attacks
Jian Chen, Xuxin Zhang, Rui Zhang, Chen Wang, Ling Liu

TL;DR
De-Pois is a novel attack-agnostic defense method that uses a mimic model and GANs to detect poisoned data in machine learning training sets, effective against multiple attack types.
Contribution
It introduces a general defense framework that does not depend on specific attack types, utilizing mimic models and GANs for robust poisoning detection.
Findings
Achieves over 0.9 accuracy and F1-score in detecting poisoned data.
Effective against four different poisoning attack types.
Outperforms existing attack-specific defenses in experiments.
Abstract
Machine learning techniques have been widely applied to various applications. However, they are potentially vulnerable to data poisoning attacks, where sophisticated attackers can disrupt the learning procedure by injecting a fraction of malicious samples into the training dataset. Existing defense techniques against poisoning attacks are largely attack-specific: they are designed for one specific type of attacks but do not work for other types, mainly due to the distinct principles they follow. Yet few general defense strategies have been developed. In this paper, we propose De-Pois, an attack-agnostic defense against poisoning attacks. The key idea of De-Pois is to train a mimic model the purpose of which is to imitate the behavior of the target model trained by clean samples. We take advantage of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) to facilitate informative training data…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Anomaly Detection Techniques and Applications · Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
