Receiver-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution
Marie Ioannou, Maria Ana Pereira, Davide Rusca, Fadri Gr\"unenfelder,, Alberto Boaron, Matthieu Perrenoud, Alastair A. Abbott, Pavel Sekatski,, Jean-Daniel Bancal, Nicolas Maring, Hugo Zbinden, Nicolas Brunner

TL;DR
This paper introduces a quantum key distribution protocol that is secure even when the receiver's device is untrusted, using limited assumptions on the sender's states and enabling practical implementation with off-the-shelf equipment.
Contribution
It proposes a receiver-device-independent QKD protocol that does not require explicit Hilbert space bounds and demonstrates its feasibility with experimental results.
Findings
Positive key rate over 4.8 km fiber demonstrated
Protocol is immune to receiver device attacks like blinding
Continuous device monitoring ensures security
Abstract
We present protocols for quantum key distribution in a prepare-and-measure setup with an asymmetric level of trust. While the device of the sender (Alice) is partially characterized, the receiver's (Bob's) device is treated as a black-box. The security of the protocols is based on the assumption that Alice's prepared states have limited overlaps, but no explicit bound on the Hilbert space dimension is required. The protocols are immune to attacks on the receiver's device, such as blinding attacks. The users can establish a secret key while continuously monitoring the correct functioning of their devices through observed statistics. We report a proof-of-principle demonstration, involving mostly off-the-shelf equipment, as well as a high-efficiency superconducting nanowire detector. A positive key rate is demonstrated over a 4.8 km low-loss optical fiber with finite-key analysis. The…
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