Will the Winner Take All? Competing Influences in Social Networks Under Information Overload
Chen Feng, Jiahui Sun, Luiyi Fu

TL;DR
This paper investigates the dynamics of influence competition in social networks, revealing that information overload prevents a single influence from dominating entirely, leading to coexistence of influences rather than a winner-takes-all outcome.
Contribution
It introduces a novel framework considering incomplete network observations and information overload, deriving conditions for influence dominance and coexistence.
Findings
Information overload acts as a boundary preventing total dominance.
Before overload, the 'winner takes all' phenomenon is likely.
After overload, influence shares stabilize based on initial conditions.
Abstract
Influence competition finds its significance in many applications, such as marketing, politics and public events like COVID-19. Existing work tends to believe that the stronger influence will always win and dominate nearly the whole network, i.e., "winner takes all". However, this finding somewhat contradicts with our common sense that many competing products are actually coexistent, e.g., Android vs. iOS. This contradiction naturally raises the question: will the winner take all? To answer this question, we make a comprehensive study into influence competition by identifying two factors frequently overlooked by prior art: (1) the incomplete observation of real diffusion networks; (2) the existence of information overload and its impact on user behaviors. To this end, we attempt to recover possible diffusion links based on user similarities, which are extracted by embedding users into…
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Taxonomy
TopicsComplex Network Analysis Techniques · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
