State capacity and vulnerability to natural disasters
Richard S.J. Tol

TL;DR
This paper reviews empirical evidence on how government quality, democracy, corruption, and tax revenue influence a country's vulnerability to natural disasters, highlighting the importance of strong institutions and fiscal capacity.
Contribution
It introduces tax revenue as a new variable in modeling disaster vulnerability and analyzes both disaster probability and damage, expanding existing literature.
Findings
Better government quality and democracy reduce disaster vulnerability.
Corruption increases vulnerability to natural disasters.
Higher income tax revenue correlates with lower disaster damage.
Abstract
Many empirical studies have shown that government quality is a key determinant of vulnerability to natural disasters. Protection against natural disasters can be a public good -- flood protection, for example -- or a natural monopoly -- early warning systems, for instance. Recovery from natural disasters is easier when the financial system is well-developed, particularly insurance services. This requires a strong legal and regulatory environment. This paper reviews the empirical literature to find that government quality and democracy reduce vulnerability to natural disasters while corruption of public officials increases vulnerability. The paper complements the literature by including tax revenue as an explanatory variable for vulnerability to natural disasters, and by modelling both the probability of natural disaster and the damage done. Countries with a larger public sector are…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAgricultural risk and resilience · Disaster Management and Resilience · Flood Risk Assessment and Management
