Spoofing Attacks Against Vehicular FMCW Radar
Rony Komissarov, Avishai Wool

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates a hardware-based spoofing attack on automotive FMCW radars, capable of generating false distance and velocity measurements, highlighting security vulnerabilities in vehicle sensor systems and proposing potential countermeasures.
Contribution
It introduces a novel spoofing attack method on FMCW radars using a single rogue radar, with a proof-of-concept implementation and real-world scenario demonstrations.
Findings
Successfully spoofed phantom emergency stop and acceleration scenarios
Demonstrated attack using Software Defined Radio hardware
Discussed countermeasures to mitigate spoofing attacks
Abstract
The safety and security of the passengers in vehicles in the face of cyber attacks is a key element in the automotive industry, especially with the emergence of the Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and the vast improvement in Autonomous Vehicles (AVs). Such platforms use various sensors, including cameras, LiDAR and mmWave radar. These sensors themselves may present a potential security hazard if exploited by an attacker. In this paper we propose a system to attack an automotive FMCW mmWave radar, that uses fast chirp modulation. Using a single rogue radar, our attack system is capable of spoofing the distance and velocity measured by the victim vehicle simultaneously, presenting phantom measurements coherent with the laws of physics governing vehicle motion. The attacking radar controls the delay in order to spoof its distance, and uses phase compensation and control in…
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Taxonomy
TopicsTraumatic Ocular and Foreign Body Injuries · Non-Invasive Vital Sign Monitoring · Microwave Imaging and Scattering Analysis
