Launching Adversarial Attacks against Network Intrusion Detection Systems for IoT
Pavlos Papadopoulos, Oliver Thornewill von Essen, Nikolaos Pitropakis,, Christos Chrysoulas, Alexios Mylonas, William J. Buchanan

TL;DR
This paper evaluates the robustness of machine learning-based IoT network intrusion detection systems against adversarial attacks, demonstrating that attackers can effectively evade detection using poisoning and gradient sign methods.
Contribution
It introduces a comprehensive evaluation of both traditional and deep learning intrusion detection models' vulnerability to adversarial attacks in IoT environments.
Findings
Adversarial attacks can significantly reduce detection accuracy.
Poisoning and gradient sign methods are effective in evading detection.
Traditional models are also vulnerable to adversarial manipulation.
Abstract
As the internet continues to be populated with new devices and emerging technologies, the attack surface grows exponentially. Technology is shifting towards a profit-driven Internet of Things market where security is an afterthought. Traditional defending approaches are no longer sufficient to detect both known and unknown attacks to high accuracy. Machine learning intrusion detection systems have proven their success in identifying unknown attacks with high precision. Nevertheless, machine learning models are also vulnerable to attacks. Adversarial examples can be used to evaluate the robustness of a designed model before it is deployed. Further, using adversarial examples is critical to creating a robust model designed for an adversarial environment. Our work evaluates both traditional machine learning and deep learning models' robustness using the Bot-IoT dataset. Our methodology…
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