The Crowd Classification Problem: Social Dynamics of Binary Choice Accuracy
Joshua Becker, Douglas Guilbeault, Ned Smith

TL;DR
This paper reveals that social influence in binary decision groups can lead to increased inaccuracy despite stronger support signals, challenging the assumption that information exchange always improves collective judgment accuracy.
Contribution
It introduces the 'crowd classification problem,' showing how information exchange can worsen decision accuracy in binary choices, supported by novel and reanalyzed datasets.
Findings
Information exchange can increase majority support regardless of accuracy.
Numeric estimate sharing can decrease binary decision accuracy.
Voting may be ineffective for optimizing group accuracy.
Abstract
Decades of research suggest that information exchange in groups and organizations can reliably improve judgment accuracy in tasks such as financial forecasting, market research, and medical decision-making. However, we show that improving the accuracy of numeric estimates does not necessarily improve the accuracy of decisions. For binary choice judgments, also known as classification tasks--e.g. yes/no or build/buy decisions--social influence is most likely to grow the majority vote share, regardless of the accuracy of that opinion. As a result, initially inaccurate groups become increasingly inaccurate after information exchange even as they signal stronger support. We term this dynamic the "crowd classification problem." Using both a novel dataset as well as a reanalysis of three previous datasets, we study this process in two types of information exchange: (1) when people share votes…
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