Evolutionary game model of group choice dilemmas on hypergraphs

TL;DR

This paper presents an evolutionary game model on hypergraphs that explains how group decision-making can deviate from individual preferences, leading to herd behavior and radical choices in social groups.

Contribution

It introduces a novel hypergraph-based evolutionary game model that captures choice shifts and irrational herding in group decision processes.

Findings

Deviations from Nash equilibrium occur on heterogeneous hypergraphs.

The model reproduces empirically observed choice shifts.

Heterogeneity in social groups influences decision outcomes.

Abstract

We introduce an evolutionary game on hypergraphs in which decisions between a risky alternative and a safe one are taken in social groups of different sizes. The model naturally reproduces choice shifts, namely the differences between the preference of individual decision makers and the consensual choice of a group, that have been empirically observed in choice dilemmas. In particular, a deviation from the Nash equilibrium towards the risky strategy occurs when the dynamics takes place on heterogeneous hypergraphs. These results can explain the emergence of irrational herding and radical behaviours in social groups.