A Distributed and Resilient Bargaining Game for Weather-Predictive Microgrid Energy Cooperation
Lu An, Jie Duan, Mo-Yuen Chow, Alexandra Duel-Hallen

TL;DR
This paper introduces a distributed bargaining game for microgrid energy cooperation that integrates weather-based renewable prediction, ensuring resilient and fair power cost allocation among users.
Contribution
It presents a novel combination of a distributed power scheduling algorithm with a Nash Bargaining Solution, incorporating weather predictions and resilience to malicious users.
Findings
Weather prediction improves day-ahead scheduling accuracy.
The bargaining game is resilient to dishonest user behavior.
The proposed method effectively allocates costs fairly among users.
Abstract
A bargaining game is investigated for cooperative energy management in microgrids. This game incorporates a fully distributed and realistic cooperative power scheduling algorithm (CoDES) as well as a distributed Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS)-based method of allocating the overall power bill resulting from CoDES. A novel weather-based stochastic renewable generation (RG) prediction method is incorporated in the power scheduling. We demonstrate the proposed game using a 4-user grid-connected microgrid model with diverse user demands, storage, and RG profiles and examine the effect of weather prediction on day-ahead power scheduling and cost/profit allocation. Finally, the impact of users' ambivalence about cooperation and /or dishonesty on the bargaining outcome is investigated, and it is shown that the proposed game is resilient to malicious users' attempts to avoid payment of their…
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