Vaccine allocation to blue-collar workers
L\'aszl\'o Czaller, Gerg\H{o} T\'oth, Bal\'azs Lengyel

TL;DR
This paper develops an economic model to optimize vaccine allocation between blue-collar and white-collar workers, emphasizing blue-collar prioritization during infection waves to reduce unemployment and economic disruption.
Contribution
It introduces a simple yet effective model for vaccine distribution that accounts for occupational differences and economic impacts, guiding prioritization strategies.
Findings
Blue-collar vaccination is optimal during infection waves with limited vaccine supply.
Prioritizing blue-collar workers can reduce unemployment and economic losses.
Model results are consistent across 28 European countries.
Abstract
Vaccination may be the solution to the pandemic-induced health crisis, but the allocation of vaccines is a complex task in which economic and social considerations can be important. The central problem is to use the limited number of vaccines in a country to reduce the risk of infection and mitigate economic uncertainty at the same time. In this paper, we propose a simple economic model for vaccine allocation across two types of workers: white-collars can work from home; while blue-collars must work on site. These worker types are complementary to each other, thus a negative shock to the supply of either one decreases the demand for the other that leads to unemployment. Using parameters of blue and white-collar labor supply, their infection risks, productivity losses at home office during lock-down, and available vaccines, we express the optimal share of vaccines allocated to…
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Taxonomy
TopicsCOVID-19 epidemiological studies · COVID-19 Pandemic Impacts · Vaccine Coverage and Hesitancy
