Voluntary safety commitments provide an escape from over-regulation in AI development
The Anh Han, Tom Lenaerts, Francisco C. Santos, and Luis Moniz Pereira

TL;DR
This paper proposes voluntary safety commitments as a flexible alternative to over-regulation in AI development, demonstrating that such commitments can lead to socially beneficial outcomes in competitive AI races.
Contribution
It introduces a novel model showing how voluntary commitments with sanctions can replace over-regulation to promote safe AI development.
Findings
Voluntary commitments improve safety outcomes in AI development.
Sanctions enforce compliance and enhance social benefits.
Over-regulation may hinder beneficial AI progress.
Abstract
With the introduction of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and related technologies in our daily lives, fear and anxiety about their misuse as well as the hidden biases in their creation have led to a demand for regulation to address such issues. Yet blindly regulating an innovation process that is not well understood, may stifle this process and reduce benefits that society may gain from the generated technology, even under the best intentions. In this paper, starting from a baseline model that captures the fundamental dynamics of a race for domain supremacy using AI technology, we demonstrate how socially unwanted outcomes may be produced when sanctioning is applied unconditionally to risk-taking, i.e. potentially unsafe, behaviours. As an alternative to resolve the detrimental effect of over-regulation, we propose a voluntary commitment approach wherein technologists have the freedom of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEthics and Social Impacts of AI · Law, AI, and Intellectual Property · Regulation and Compliance Studies
