Shared-Dining: Broadcasting Secret Shares using Dining-Cryptographers Groups
David M\"odinger, Juri Dispan, Franz J. Hauck

TL;DR
This paper introduces a privacy-preserving broadcast protocol using modified dining cryptographers and secret sharing, ensuring message anonymity and robustness against malicious participants with minimal performance overhead.
Contribution
It presents a novel combination of dining cryptographers and Shamir's secret sharing for anonymous message broadcasting with provable privacy guarantees.
Findings
Provides (n-|attackers|)-anonymity for up to k-1 attackers.
Achieves throughput of 10-100 kB/s suitable for high-privacy applications.
Demonstrates security and performance through a prototype implementation.
Abstract
A k-anonymous broadcast can be implemented using a small group of dining cryptographers to first share the message, followed by a flooding phase started by group members. Members have little incentive to forward the message in a timely manner, as forwarding incurs costs, or they may even profit from keeping the message. In worst case, this leaves the true originator as the only sender, rendering the dining-cryptographers phase useless and compromising their privacy. We present a novel approach using a modified dining-cryptographers protocol to distributed shares of an (n,k)-Shamir's secret sharing scheme. Finally, all group members broadcast their received share through the network, allowing any recipient of k shares to reconstruct the message, enforcing anonymity. If less than k group members broadcast their shares, the message cannot be decoded thus preventing privacy breaches for the…
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