Achieving Transparency Report Privacy in Linear Time
Chien-Lun Chen, Leana Golubchik, Ranjan Pal

TL;DR
This paper introduces a linear-time optimal privacy scheme for transparency reports that balances privacy, utility, and fairness, addressing a critical gap in formal understanding of privacy impacts in algorithmic transparency.
Contribution
It proposes the first analytical framework for simultaneously analyzing privacy, utility, and fairness trade-offs in algorithmic transparency reports using linear fractional programming.
Findings
Demonstrates potential privacy hazards in transparency and fairness measures
Proposes a linear-time optimal privacy-preserving scheme for ATRs
Quantifies privacy-utility trade-offs and analyzes impact on fairness
Abstract
An accountable algorithmic transparency report (ATR) should ideally investigate the (a) transparency of the underlying algorithm, and (b) fairness of the algorithmic decisions, and at the same time preserve data subjects' privacy. However, a provably formal study of the impact to data subjects' privacy caused by the utility of releasing an ATR (that investigates transparency and fairness), is yet to be addressed in the literature. The far-fetched benefit of such a study lies in the methodical characterization of privacy-utility trade-offs for release of ATRs in public, and their consequential application-specific impact on the dimensions of society, politics, and economics. In this paper, we first investigate and demonstrate potential privacy hazards brought on by the deployment of transparency and fairness measures in released ATRs. To preserve data subjects' privacy, we then propose a…
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Taxonomy
TopicsPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in Data · Blockchain Technology Applications and Security · Auction Theory and Applications
