Multi-planner intervention in network games with community structures

TL;DR

This paper analyzes how multiple local planners can intervene in network games with community structures to influence agent behavior, providing equilibrium analysis and algorithms for optimal interventions.

Contribution

It introduces a model for multi-planner interventions in network games with community structures, including equilibrium analysis and algorithms for finding subgame perfect equilibria.

Findings

Equilibrium analysis of multi-planner interventions in network games.

Algorithms for computing subgame perfect equilibria.

A two-level efficiency measure for intervention outcomes.

Abstract

Network games study the strategic interaction of agents connected through a network. Interventions in such a game -- actions a coordinator or planner may take that change the utility of the agents and thus shift the equilibrium action profile -- are introduced to improve the planner's objective. We study the problem of intervention in network games where the network has a group structure with local planners, each associated with a group. The agents play a non-cooperative game while the planners may or may not have the same optimization objective. We model this problem using a sequential move game where planners make interventions followed by agents playing the intervened game. We provide equilibrium analysis and algorithms that find the subgame perfect equilibrium. We also propose a two-level efficiency definition to study the efficiency loss of equilibrium actions in this type of game.