DP-Sync: Hiding Update Patterns in Secure Outsourced Databases with Differential Privacy
Chenghong Wang, Johes Bater, Kartik Nayak, Ashwin Machanavajjhala

TL;DR
This paper introduces DP-Sync, a framework that enhances encrypted databases by protecting update patterns using differential privacy, thereby safeguarding the entire update history from leakage.
Contribution
It formalizes update pattern leakage and proposes DP-Sync, extending existing encrypted database schemes with differential privacy guarantees for update histories.
Findings
DP-Sync effectively hides update patterns in encrypted databases.
The framework ensures differential privacy for the entire data update history.
It extends existing schemes to prevent update pattern leakage.
Abstract
In this paper, we have introduced a new type of leakage associated with modern encrypted databases called update pattern leakage. We formalize the definition and security model of DP-Sync with DP update patterns. We also proposed the framework DP-Sync, which extends existing encrypted database schemes to DP-Sync with DP update patterns. DP-Sync guarantees that the entire data update history over the outsourced data structure is protected by differential privacy. This is achieved by imposing differentially-private strategies that dictate the data owner's synchronization of local~data.
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