Evolutionary Strategies with Analogy Partitions in p-guessing Games
Aymeric Vie

TL;DR
This paper introduces an evolutionary learning model using analogy partitions to analyze strategic behavior in unstable p-guessing games, providing insights into how agents adapt and develop reasoning levels in fluctuating environments.
Contribution
It develops a genetic algorithm-based framework to study learning dynamics and reasoning levels in p-guessing games with unstable parameters, linking evolutionary processes to cognitive hierarchy models.
Findings
Genetic algorithm converges to Nash equilibrium in stable environments.
Behavior in mixed regimes reflects different levels of reasoning.
Learning process models transitions between reasoning levels.
Abstract
In Keynesian Beauty Contests notably modeled by p-guessing games, players try to guess the average of guesses multiplied by p. Convergence of plays to Nash equilibrium has often been justified by agents' learning. However, interrogations remain on the origin of reasoning types and equilibrium behavior when learning takes place in unstable environments. When successive values of p can take values above and below 1, bounded rational agents may learn about their environment through simplified representations of the game, reasoning with analogies and constructing expectations about the behavior of other players. We introduce an evolutionary process of learning to investigate the dynamics of learning and the resulting optimal strategies in unstable p-guessing games environments with analogy partitions. As a validation of the approach, we first show that our genetic algorithm behaves…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications
